Its been 4 months since I last wrote about global BGP hijacking, when Indosat advertised 320k prefixes. This time The Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit has documented 51 hijacked more specific prefixes which were used along with overly trusting network code decisions in cryptocoin mining pool software (no TLS) to redirect miners to an alternate mining server running on a bogon route @ 126.96.36.199.
The article doesn’t mention the specific Canadian ISP which originated the hijacking, nor the upstream, but it is not hard to discover both through Ripe.net’s ripestat service, here is 188.8.131.52/24 and its history from January 1 through May 31. 184.108.40.206/24 was the first, and most often hijacked network listed in Appendix A of the SecureWorks article.
220.127.116.11/24 is a BOGON/un-allocated prefix. One of AS21548’s peers, AS6939, did not filter its connection, and subsequently, allowed the more specific /24’s to propagate the internet, as well as accepting the BOGON, and propagating it. This route is still actively propagated from AS21548 via AS6939 at time of writing.
I feel for Digital Ocean customers in 18.104.22.168/24 and 22.214.171.124/24, service would have been affected 14+ times for short blips. This would have been frustrating for both sides to troubleshoot to say the least, with short 10-15 minute hijackings. There were 9 prefixes in total from Digital Ocean hijacked.
Update 2014-08-12: BGPMon has an article up about the hijackings: http://www.bgpmon.net/the-canadian-bitcoin-hijack/